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MORAL PROGRESS, 
MENTAL RETARDATION, 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
WO major aspects of the death penalty in the
United States directly involve physicians: how
the death penalty is carried out and who is sub-
ject to execution. As a matter of constitutional law,
both are governed by the prohibition against “cruel
and unusual” punishment in the Eighth Amendment.
The meaning of “cruel and unusual,” unlike every oth-
er part of the U.S. Constitution, is determined by pub-
lic opinion as it reflects society’s evolving standards
of decency. With regard to how the death penalty is
carried out, the role of physicians in capital punish-
ment has been controversial for more than two dec-
ades.1-3 As traditional methods of execution, such as
hanging, electrocution, and the gas chamber, have
been rejected by the courts as cruel and unusual, le-
thal injection, with its aura of medical legitimacy, has
become the almost universal method of choice in the
United States.1 “Killing with kindness” by lethal in-
jection has had a major role in continued public sup-
port for the death penalty.1,4 Physicians can play many
parts in capital punishment, including preparing the
prisoner for execution, supervising the execution, and
pronouncing the prisoner dead, most of which are
considered unethical.1-3 A physician invented the guil-
lotine, and physicians regularly supervised executions
— from the naval surgeon who made sure that the
hanging of Melville’s Billy Budd was “scientifically
conducted”5 to the physician who pinned a white cir-
cle over Gary Gilmore’s heart as a target for the firing
squad.6
The second major aspect of the death penalty that
involves physicians is the determination of who is in-
eligible for execution. A new decision by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, Atkins v. Virginia, expands a past prohi-
bition against executing mentally incompetent persons
to include a prohibition against the execution of a per-
son with a diagnosis of mental retardation.7,8 Since this
decision was based on the Court’s view that public
opinion has evolved to a point at which society views
the execution of a mentally retarded person as cruel
and unusual punishment, it is critical to understand
the political context of the decision, which is best il-
T
lustrated by the part the death penalty (and its ap-
plication to retarded persons) has played in presiden-
tial politics. Michael Dukakis, who opposed the death
penalty, was brutalized in his presidential campaign
for being soft on crime. In the next presidential race,
Bill Clinton took time off from his New Hampshire
primary campaign to return to Arkansas to preside
over the execution of Rickey Ray Rector. Rector was
a violent criminal, but after murdering a police officer,
he shot himself in the head. He survived but had se-
vere brain damage.
Rector did not fit the medical definitions of men-
tal retardation (since his condition did not manifest
itself by 18 years of age), but he was widely considered
by the public to be retarded. Nonetheless, the courts
found him competent to stand trial and, later, compe-
tent to be executed, ruling that any clemency would
have to come from Governor Clinton.9,10 None was
forthcoming, even though there is little doubt that
Rector did not understand that he was going to be
executed, as illustrated by the fact that just before his
execution he decided to save the pecan pie from his
last meal so that he could eat it before he went to bed
that night.11 The sympathy of the public, however, was
clearly with the families of Rector’s victims rather than
with Rector himself. After the execution of Rector, the
“soft on crime” label that had plagued Dukakis could
not be pinned on Clinton. As political consultant Da-
vid Garth put it, Clinton “had someone put to death
who had only part of a brain. You can’t find them any
tougher than that.”12
Bill Clinton’s decision to permit the execution of a
prisoner with severe brain damage was made 10 years
ago. Three years before that, the U.S. Supreme Court
had decided that it was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution to execute a mentally retarded person. This
was because mental retardation could be taken into
account as mitigating evidence in imposing sentence,
and because there was “insufficient evidence” of a “na-
tional consensus against execution of the mentally re-
tarded.”13 And in 1999, after the Texas Senate voted
to ban the execution of the mentally retarded, Gover-
nor George W. Bush voiced his opposition, saying,
“That’s up to juries to make those decisions. . . . I
like the law the way it is right now.”14
In June 2002, in Atkins, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed itself, ruling that the values of Americans have
shifted during the past decade and that there now is a
national consensus opposing the execution of the men-
tally retarded.8 Directly at issue in this case are global
questions of moral progress and human dignity. In-
directly implicated is the related issue of the role of
medicine and physicians in the death penalty. The case
involved Daryl Renard Atkins and the decision of
the Commonwealth of Virginia to execute him.
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THE CRIME
After a day spent drinking alcohol and smoking
marijuana, William Jones and Daryl Renard Atkins
abducted Eric Nesbitt outside a convenience store at
midnight. They robbed him of the cash he was carry-
ing and drove him in his pickup truck to an automated
teller machine, where they forced him to withdraw an
additional $200. They then took him to a deserted
area, where, despite his pleas, he was shot eight times,
in the thorax, abdomen, arms, and legs, and killed.
Each defendant testified that the other had fired the
shots that killed Nesbitt, but the jury evidently be-
lieved that Atkins had done it. Jones was permitted to
plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for his
testimony against Atkins. This plea made Jones ineli-
gible for the death sentence.8
At the penalty phase, the defense relied solely on the
testimony of Evan Nelson, a forensic psychologist who
had evaluated Atkins before the trial and found him
“mildly mentally retarded.” His conclusion was based
on interviews with Atkins and people who knew At-
kins, a review of his school and court records, and the
measurement of his IQ as 59 on the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale. The jury sentenced Atkins to death,
but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sen-
tencing hearing because the judge had used a mislead-
ing verdict form. At the second hearing, Nelson testi-
fied again. This time, however, the state presented its
own forensic psychologist, Stanton Samenow, who tes-
tified that Atkins was not mentally retarded but rath-
er was of “average intelligence at least.” The jury also
heard testimony about the defendant’s 16 prior fel-
ony convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, ab-
duction, use of a firearm, and maiming. He was again
sentenced to death, and the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the sentence.15 Two judges dissented, noting
that Samenow’s opinion that Atkins possessed aver-
age intelligence was “incredulous as a matter of law”
and concluding that “the imposition of the sentence
of death upon a criminal defendant who has the men-
tal age of a child between the ages of 9 and 12 is ex-
cessive.” In their words, “It is indefensible to conclude
that individuals who are mentally retarded are not to
some degree less culpable for their criminal acts. By
definition, such individuals have substantial limita-
tions not shared by the general population. A moral
and civilized society diminishes itself if its system of
justice does not afford recognition and consideration
of those limitations in a meaningful way.”15
THE PUNISHMENT
The U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear the ap-
peal of Daryl Atkins not only “because of the gravity
of the concerns expressed by the dissenters” but also
“in light of the dramatic shift in the state legislative
landscape that has occurred in the past 13 years.”8
There was only one question before the Court: is
the execution of a mentally retarded defendant “cruel
and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? The Court had
previously ruled that the Eighth Amendment, the text
of which reads, “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted,” was based on the “precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduat-
ed and proportioned to the offense.”16 Moreover,
judgments about whether a punishment is excessive
are to be made not on the basis of the standards that
prevailed when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but
on the basis of those that “currently prevail.”8 As Chief
Justice Earl Warren put it in a 1958 opinion: “The
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. . . . The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.”17 A determination of existing
standards is to be based on “objective factors to the
maximum possible extent.”17
As noted above, 13 years ago the Court concluded
that executing a mentally retarded person did not vi-
olate the Eighth Amendment.13 The case involved the
brain-damaged, mentally retarded John Paul Penry,
who was convicted of brutally raping, beating, and
stabbing a woman to death with a pair of scissors. In
that case, the Court found that only two states (Geor-
gia and Maryland) had adopted laws banning the ex-
ecution of a mentally retarded person. Opinion polls
showing that large majorities of the public in Texas,
Florida, and Georgia opposed executing the mental-
ly retarded, coupled with the fact that 14 states had
no death penalty, were considered insufficient evi-
dence to support the conclusion that there was “a na-
tional consensus” on the subject.13
But, as Justice John Paul Stevens, who wrote for the
majority of the Court in the six-to-three opinion in
Atkins, noted, “state legislatures across the country
began to address the issue,” at least partially in re-
sponse to the Court’s 1989 decision.8 Since 1990,
laws banning the use of the death penalty for the men-
tally retarded have been passed in Kentucky, Tennes-
see, New Mexico, Arkansas (which passed its law in
1993, the year after Rector was executed), Colorado,
Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska,
South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Mis-
souri, and North Carolina. The 18 states with such
laws do not represent a majority of the 38 states with
the death penalty, but the Court decided that “it is
not so much the number of these States that is signif-
icant, but the consistency of the direction of change,
[especially] given the well-known fact that anticrime
legislation is far more popular than legislation pro-
viding protection for persons guilty of violent crime.”8
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The Court, noting further that no state has specif-
ically authorized the execution of the mentally retard-
ed, and that even in the states that still permit it, only
five people with an IQ below 70 have actually been
executed in the past 13 years, concluded that “the
practice . . . has become truly unusual, and it is fair
to say that a national consensus has developed against
it.”8 A footnote to this last sentence offers “additional
evidence” that the states are reflecting “a much broad-
er social and professional consensus.” Such evidence
includes positions adopted by professional associa-
tions such as the American Psychological Association;
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist traditions;
the fact that the “world community” overwhelmingly
disapproves of executing the mentally retarded; and
state and national public opinion polls that demon-
strate “a widespread consensus among Americans.”8
IDENTIFYING THE MENTALLY RETARDED
Although it left to the individual states the determi-
nation of whether a person is mentally retarded, the
Court did stress the importance of applying the clin-
ical definition. In this regard, it set forth both the
definition of the American Association on Mental Re-
tardation (AAMR) and that of the American Psychi-
atric Association (APA). The AAMR defines mental
retardation as “substantial limitations in present func-
tioning,” and elaborates that “it is characterized by
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, ex-
isting concurrently with related limitations in two or
more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social skills,
community use, self-direction, health and safety, func-
tional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retarda-
tion manifests before age 18.”8
The definition used by the APA is substantially the
same: “The essential feature of mental retardation is
significantly subaverage general intellectual function-
ing (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant
limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of
the following skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of com-
munity resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B).
The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion
C). . . . ‘Mild’ mental retardation is typically used
to describe people with an IQ level of 50–55 to ap-
proximately 70.”8
The Court concluded that although such “defi-
ciencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal
sanctions . . . they do diminish personal culpabili-
ty.”8 Specifically, the Court noted that the only two
justifications for the death penalty — retribution and
deterrence — could not be furthered by executing
mentally retarded persons. In regard to retribution,
the Court had previously noted that the death penal-
ty must be reserved for particularly extreme crimes.
In this context, the Court concluded, “If the culpa-
bility of the average murderer is insufficient to justify
the most extreme sanction available to the State, the
lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender
surely does not merit that form of retribution.”8 As
for deterrence, the Court found that the same mental
deficiencies that make a person retarded make it “less
likely that they can process the information of the
possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result,
control their conduct based upon that information.”8
THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Dissenting opinions were written by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia; they
each joined the other’s opinion, and both were joined
by Justice Clarence Thomas. The Chief Justice was
particularly upset that the Court put any weight at all
on “foreign laws, the views of professional and reli-
gious organizations, and opinion polls in reaching its
conclusion,” arguing that such sources were irrelevant.
Instead, he insisted that only two sources, “the work
product of legislatures and sentencing jury determi-
nations,” are “objective indicia of contemporary values
firmly supported by our precedents.”8
Justice Scalia opined, “Seldom has an opinion of
this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the
personal views of its members.” Scalia argued that
there is no “national consensus,” since only 18 of the
38 states that permit capital punishment (or 47 per-
cent) exempt the mentally retarded, and agreed with
the Chief Justice that the other sources cited in sup-
port of a consensus were irrelevant. He concluded,
moreover, that the definitions of mental retardation
adopted by the AAMR and the APA will lead to
“turning the process of capital trial into a game,” be-
cause “the symptoms of this condition can readily be
feigned,” and “the capital defendant who feigns men-
tal retardation risks nothing at all.”8
MORAL PROGRESS
Justice Scalia seems to be correct that the justices
are voicing their personal opinions of the rightness or
wrongness of executing a mentally retarded killer. We
can also be skeptical of the concept of moral progress.
As philosopher Jonathan Glover has persuasively ar-
gued, “At the start of the twentieth century, reflective
Europeans were able to believe in moral progress,
and to see human viciousness and barbarism as in re-
treat. At the end of the century [which has seen the
results of technology in the service of the destructive
side of human psychology], it is hard to be confident
either about the moral law or about moral progress.”18
But we do not have to view moral progress as inev-
itable to believe that human beings can become
ashamed of their brutal behavior and take steps to try
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to prevent it. This is what the majority of the countries
in the world have done in abolishing the death pen-
alty itself, and what the U.S. Supreme Court has now
done in prohibiting the execution of mentally retard-
ed killers.
Scalia is simply wrong to try to read the “cruel and
unusual” injunction in the Eighth Amendment as
the citizens of the United States would have read it in
1791. I also think that the majority of the Court is
correct to look beyond the shores of the United States
to what is going on in the rest of the world. After all,
we are all members of the same species, we are all en-
dowed with human dignity, and we all share the same
planet and future. We do not always or inevitably
progress to be better people, but we should certainly
not aspire to limit our national morality to that of
an age in which none of us live and in which almost
none of our technology existed.
WHITHER CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?
The Court’s opinion has evoked contrasting re-
sponses concerning its effect on the broader ques-
tion of the death penalty itself. One view is that this
opinion may be seen as part of an inexorable, if slow,
march of moral progress toward the abolition of the
death penalty.19 In this view, the United States has be-
come, as the Court noted, increasingly out of step
with the democracies of the rest of the world. In a
post–September 11 world, we not only line up with
countries in the “axis of evil” in maintaining our death
penalty, we also make it less likely that any European
country will extradite suspected terrorists to the Unit-
ed States, because of the possibility that they will face
the death penalty.
The contrasting view holds that the public’s sup-
port for the death penalty only erodes when it is ap-
plied in ways that seem unjust and unfair, such as
against the mentally retarded or those whose lawyers
fall asleep during their trials. If these cases were re-
moved from the domain of the death penalty, its use
in the remaining cases might seem fair and just; if
so, the death penalty itself would be more likely, rath-
er than less likely, to survive.20
Following the logic of Atkins, the next category
of killers most likely to be exempted from the death
penalty are those who were 16 or 17 years of age at
the time they committed the crime (constitutional law
prohibits the execution of criminals 15 years of age
or younger).21 Nonetheless, in October 2002, in a ha-
beas corpus petition in which five votes were needed,
only four justices voted to take up this issue.22 Shortly
thereafter, Attorney General John Ashcroft decided
that the accused Washington, D.C.–area snipers who
were arrested in October would be tried in Virginia,
because it permits the execution of juvenile offenders
and one of the accused is 17 years old.23
THE ROLE OF PHYSICIANS
In May 2002, the American Medical Association
“strongly reaffirmed” its opposition to the participa-
tion of physicians in executions, as outlined in its fre-
quently updated ethical statement on capital punish-
ment.24 It is likely that, as a result of Atkins, more
convicted killers will want to be labeled mentally re-
tarded, and more physicians and psychologists will be
asked to become involved in evaluations. Serving as
an agent of the state and using one’s medical skills to
help make a mentally ill prisoner “fit” for execution is,
of course, a perversion of medicine, in the same cat-
egory as monitoring the health of a person who is
being tortured.25 But the application of medical cri-
teria to the possible end of removing someone from
within the reach of the death penalty on the basis of
mental retardation need not be classified as unethical
medical work that puts the physician in the service
of the state’s death machinery. Because the medical
criteria used to diagnose mental retardation are so
vague, however, it may be difficult for physicians to act
in any but a political manner in this context, at least
in borderline cases. Terms such as “substantial limita-
tions” and “significantly subaverage,” for example, are
inherently subjective. IQ tests are notoriously mis-
leading, and there is no blood test or other more ob-
jective clinical test to determine whether someone is
mentally retarded.26 Moreover, physicians could un-
derstandably decline to participate in this way, even
before trial, arguing that their participation in any
phase of a proceeding that could end in the death pen-
alty lends legitimacy to capital punishment and thus
makes medicine complicit in executions.
As the Court makes clear in finding the execution
of the mentally retarded unconstitutional, the contin-
ued ability of the justices to support the constitution-
ality of the death penalty rests on its approval by pub-
lic opinion. Public opinion has turned against virtually
all forms of execution except lethal injection, because
this medicalized form of killing makes capital pun-
ishment appear much more benign and certainly less
grisly than hanging, electrocution, gassing, or the use
of a firing squad. Public opinion, as ascertained by the
U.S. Supreme Court, has also turned against the ex-
ecution of certain categories of persons, now includ-
ing the mentally retarded. Not only does medicine
determine how the state may execute condemned
persons, but medicine must now also determine who
is eligible to be put to death by the state. Therefore,
I think physicians have a special ethical responsibility
to participate actively in the ongoing debate over
capital punishment.
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